Elijah Liam 寫於 2014年5月26日 20:38
根據美國國家安全委員會和總統的工作人員的有關參謀長聯席會議對福爾摩沙的軍事觀點
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d11
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1952-1954
VOLUME XIV, PART 1, CHINA AND JAPAN (IN TWO PARTS), DOCUMENT 11
S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351
No. 11
Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of Defense (Foster) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)1
Washington, 22 March 1952.
Top Secret
NSC 128
美國1952-1954年外交關係
XIV卷,第1部,中國和日本(兩部分),文件11
S / S-NSC文件,很多63 D351
第11號
備忘錄由國防部代理秘書長(福斯特),以國家安全委員會執行秘書(萊)1
華盛頓,1952年3月22日。
絕密
國科會128
I am transmitting herewith for the consideration of the National Security Council and the President the following statement of the military views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding Formosa:
“The denial of Formosa to communism is of major importance to United States security interests, and is of vital importance to the long-term United States position in the Far East.
(拒絕共產主義對福爾摩沙對美國安全利益來說是有重大意義的,而且是美國在遠東至關重要的長期立場。)
“Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, for the foreseeable future and until conditions in the Far East have become peaceful and stable, the United States should:
(因此,參謀長聯席會議認為,在可預見得到的未來,直到在遠東條件已成為和平與穩定,美國應該 :)
a. Take such measures as may be necessary to deny Formosa to any Chinese regime aligned with or dominated by the USSR;
(a.採取防禦福爾摩沙這樣的措施可能是必要的不管是中國結盟政權或由蘇聯主導)
b. In its own interests, take unilateral action if necessary, to insure the continued availability of Formosa as a base for possible United States military operations;
(b.在自身的利益,如果有必要採取單方面行動,以確保福爾摩沙作為可能美國軍事行動的基地的持續可用性)
c. Continue that part of the mission presently assigned to the 7th Fleet relative to the protection of Formosa until such time as conditions in the Far East permit the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa to assume the burden of the defense of that island;
(c.繼續目前分配到第七艦隊相對於福爾摩沙的保護,直至在遠東條件允許中國國民黨在福爾摩沙負擔使命的防禦那做島;)
d. Support a friendly Chinese regime on Formosa to the end that it will be firmly aligned with the United States; and
(d.友好的支持在福爾摩沙上的中國政權,最後它會牢牢地與美國成為緊密的盟友;還有)
e. Develop and maintain the military potential of that Chinese regime on Formosa.”
The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that these military views should be overriding and should govern United States policy for the foreseeable future and in the course of any United States negotiations which may follow an armistice in Korea.
(e.開發和維護中國政權在福爾摩沙上的軍事潛力。“參謀長聯席會議認為,應該優先處理這些軍事觀點,並應由美國政策在可預見的未來治理,在美國任何談判過程中可能依照在韓國的停戰)
In addition, a review of the objectives of current programs of military assistance and covert activities has indicated the need for early resolution of certain fundamental questions of concern to the National Security Council. Accordingly, I recommend that the Council undertake, at an early date, a review of NSC 48/52 insofar as it pertains to United States policy toward Formosa, the Chinese Nationalist Government, and other anti-Communist Chinese forces.
(此外,軍事援助和秘密活動的現行方案的目標的審查表明,需要關注的國家安全委員會的一些基本問題早日得到解決。因此,我建議安理會進行,早日,審查國科會48/52的,只要它涉及到美國對福爾摩沙政策,中國國民政府,和其他反共的中國軍隊。)
William C. Foster
這些代表了什麼?? 台灣現在到底是誰在說話啊.....
搞清楚啊你們....台灣有老大的
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