美國CIA解密文件 ORE 39-49：從法律的角度來看，台灣不是中國的一部分共和國，有待一個對日和約，美國在島上保持佔有領土專有權益。
Elijah Liam 寫於 2014年6月9日 21:36
台灣人悲慘的歷史真相由美國CIA來告訴你.....CIA解密文件ORE 39-49
這是美國CIA解密文件,敘說了當初台灣在國際上是如何的"嶄露頭角",如何的被利用,還有
原來的台灣住民如何的被欺負....看完了...會心酸,會悲哀...這就是....台灣人....
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CIA官方網站引用網址:
http://www.foia.cia.gov/search-results?search_api_views_fulltext=ORE+39-49&field_collection=
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文件內容如下
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN TAIWAN
中情局歷史回顧程序的發布在全台灣發展情況的可能性
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
發布通知
1.THIS COPY OF THIS PUBLICATION AND USE OF THE RECIPIENT DESIGNATED
ON THE FRONT COVER AND OF INDIVIDUALS UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE
RECIPLENT'S OFFICE WHO REQUIRE THE INFORMATION FOR THE PERFORMANCE
OF THEIR DUTIES. FURTHER DISSEMINATION ELSEWHERE IN THE DEPARTMENT
TO OTHER OFFICES WHICH REQUIRE THE INFORMATION FOR THE PERFORMANCE
OF OFFICICAL DUTIES MAY BE AUTHORIZED BY THE FOLLOWING:
此副本和封面上的指定收件人與司法管轄權下人士的接受者們,在辦公室裡被要求履行此訊息職責之人員.未來發布其他地方與需要的信息其他職位系用於官方履職情況可授權情況如下：
a. SPECIAL ASSIATANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR RESEARCH AND
INTELLIGENCE, FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
特別助理國務卿用於研究和情報，致國務院
b. DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, GS, USA, FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
情報指揮者，GS，美國陸軍部
c. CHIEF, NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
首席指揮官，海軍情報
d. DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, USAF, FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
情報指揮者，美國空軍
e. DIRECTOR OF SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE, AEC, FOR THE ATOMIC ENERGY
COMMISSION
國家安全情報指揮者，美國原子能原委員會
f. DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, JOINT STAFF, FOR THE JOINT STAFF
代理情報指揮，聯合單位
g. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION, CIA, FOR ANY
OTHER DEPARTMENT OF AGENCY
助理指揮收集與發佈，CIA
2. THIS COPY MAY BE EITHER RETAINED OR DESTROYED BY BURING IN ACCORDANCE
WITH APPLICABLE SECURITY REGULATIONS, OR RETURNED TO THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY BY ARRANGEMENT WITH THE OFFICE OF COLLECTION AND
DISSEMINATION,CIA.
按照適用的安全法規這個副本可以是保留還是銷毀埋在，或退還給中央情報局通過協議安排與辦公室收集和傳播，美國中央情報局。
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN TAIWAN
台灣可能的發展情況
SUMMARY
摘要
1. COMMUNIST CONTROL OF TAIWAN AND CONSEQUENT SOVIET ACCESS TO THE
ISLAND IN WARTIME WOULD HAVE SERIOUSLY UNFAVORABLE IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE US.
共產制度控制台灣還有隨之而來的蘇聯訪問在這個戰爭時期將嚴重對美國產生不良的影響。
2.FROM THE LEGAL STANDPOINT,TAIWAN IS NOT PART OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
PENDING A JAPANESE PEACE TREATY,THE ISLAND REMAINS OCCUPIED TERRITORY
IN WHICH THE US HAS PROPRIETARY INTERESTS.
從法律的角度來看，台灣不是中國的一部分共和國。有待一個對日和約，美國在島上保持佔有領土專有權益。
3.THE NATIVE POPULATION OF TAIWAN WOULD WELCOME RELEASE FROM CHINESE
CONTROL,BUT IS NOT NOW STRONG ENOUGH TO STAGE A SUCCESSFUL REVOLT.
THE TAIWANESE AREINCREASINGLY RESTIVE,HOWEVER,BECAUSE OF THE INFLUX
OF NATIONALIST OFFICIALS AND MILITARY FORCES, AND WILL BECOME MORE
SUSCEPTIBLE TO COMMUNIST INFLUENCE
在台灣出生的本地人口很歡迎從中國人控制中解放，但現在未強大到足以上演一出成功的反叛。 台灣人越來越難以控制，但是，由於國民黨官員的湧入， 軍事力量，將會變得更加容易受到 共產黨影響
4.ASSUMING US INACTIVITY,TAIWAN WILL EVENTUALLY PASS UNDER THE CONTROL
OF THECHINESE COMMUNISTS. IN ANY US PROGRAM TO PREVENT THIS, THE
ADVANTAGES TO BE GAINED FROM THE STRATEGIC MILITARY VIEWPOINT WOULD
HAVE TO BE WEIGHED AGAINST UNFAVORABLE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES,THE
EXTENT OF WHICH WOULD VARY DEPENDING UPON THE SELECTION AND TIMING
OF MEASURES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAM.
假設美國沒有任何行動，台灣終會轉移到的中國共產黨人的控制下。在任何美國防止這種情況的方案中，從獲得軍事戰略觀點上的優勢來看，將不得不權衡不利的政治後果，其中範圍會有所不同，這取決於措施執行本方案的選擇和時間。
AT THE PRESENT TIME THERE APPEARS TO BE NO REALISTIC MEANS FOR PREVENTING
THE EARLY ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMUNIST-DOMINATED GOVERNMENT OVER ALL
CHINA. IT CAN BE ASSUMEDTHAT SUCH A GOVERNMENT WOULD STRIVE TO
ESTABLISH ITS AUTHORITY IN TAIWAN. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT EVEN NOW THE
CHINESE COMMUNISTS ARE SEEKING TO EXTEND THEIR CONTROL TO THAT ISLAND,
AND THEY MAY BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE THESE EFFORTS. THE CHINESE
COMMUNISTS WILL NOT FINALLY SECURE THEIR PROSPECTIVE VICTORY IN CHINA
UNTIL THEY CONTROL TAIWAN, INASMUCH AS THE PRESENT NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
IS NOW DEVELOPINGTAIWAN AS A PRINCIPAL BASE FOR CONTINUING THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST COMMUNISTS WILL REMAIN PRO-SOVIET, AND THAT A GOVERNMENT
ESTABLISHED BY THEM WOULD BE A WARTIME ALLY OF THE USSR
用手段防止一個早期成立的共產黨政府對所有中國的控制，以目前的時間似乎是不可實現。我們可以假設，這樣的政府將努力樹立其權威在台灣。有證據表明，即使是現在中共正試圖擴大 他們對那個島的控制 ，還有預計他們可能將會繼續這些努力。中共將沒有確保他們在中國最終的 前瞻性勝利直到他們控制台灣，作為生死關頭的當今政府現正以發展台灣為主要基礎，來繼續對 抗共產黨人的持續親蘇，並因此確立他們的政府將是一個戰時的蘇聯盟友。
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN TAIWAN
台灣可能的發展情況
1. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF TAIWAN TO THE US.
台灣對美國的戰略重要性。
THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST CONTROL OF TAIWAN
WITH THE PROSPECT OF CONSEQUENT SOVIET TO THE ISLAND, WOULD BE
SERIOUSLY UNFAVORABLE TO THE SECURITY OF THE US.
預測中國共產黨控制台灣與隨之而來的蘇聯在島上的戰略影響，將嚴重不利於美國的安全。
COMMUNIST VICTORIES IN CHINA WILL PROBABLY IN THE NEAR FUTURE DENY
US ACCESS TO ALL THE STRATEGICALLY VALUABLE AREAS OF THE CHINESE
MAINLAND. THIS CIRCUMSTANCE WILL INCREASE THE POTENTIAL VALUE TO
THE US OF TAIWAN, IN THE EVENT OF WAR, AS AN AREA FOR STAGING TROOPS
,AS A BASE FOR STRATEGIC AIR OPERATIONS,AS A NAVAL BASE FOR CONTROLLING
SEA ROUTES BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE SOUTH,AND AS AN IMPORTANT LINK IN
THE US DEFENSE CHINA OF MUTUALLYSUPPORTING ISLANDS.
中國共產黨的勝利很可能會在不久的將來否認美國進入中國大陸的所有戰略價值的領域。 這種情況下會增加台灣對美國的潛在價值，在戰爭情況下，如一個區域用於分段部隊， 作為戰略的空軍行動基地，為海軍基地用於控制日本和南方之間的海上航線，而作為一個重要 橋樑在美國防禦中國中相互支援的島嶼。
ASSUMING THAT A NEW COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN CHINA WILL BE ORIENTED
TOWARD THE USSR,AND WOULD BE A WARTIME SOVIET ALLY, COMMUNIST
CONTROL OF TAIWAN WOULD ALLOW SOVIET ACCESS TO THE ISLAND IN THE
EVENT OF WAR. MILITARY EXPLOITATION OF TAIWAN BY THE USSR WOULD
INCREASE SOVIET CAPABILITY FOR DISRUPTING SEA AND AIR COMMUNICATIONS
IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC AREA, AND FOR CONDUCTING OPERATIONS AGAINST
THE RYUKYUS AND THE PHILIPPINES.
假設在中國共產黨新政權以蘇聯為方向，並在戰時為蘇聯的盟友，共產黨控制的台灣將允許蘇聯在戰爭情形下登陸島上。台灣由蘇聯軍事開發利用將增加蘇維埃在西太平洋地區擾亂海上和空中交通的能力，和打擊琉球群島及菲律賓的指揮行動。
TAIWAN DOES NOT POSSESS ANY SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES OF STRATEGIC
MATERIALS NOR DOES IT HAVE A LARGE INDUSTRIAL POTENTIAL. THE ISLAND
,NEVERTHELESS, WOULD BE AN ECONOMIC AS-SET RATHER THAN A LIABILITY
TO ANY OCCUPYING POWER. TAIWAN CURRENTLY PRODUCES EXPORTABLE
SURPLUSES OF RICE,SUGAR,AND OTHER FOODS WHICH COULD PLAY AN
IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE FOOD-DEFICIT ECONOMIES OF EITHER CHINA OR
JAPAN. IF SUFFICIENT FERTILIZER WERE AVAILABLE,AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTION COULD BE INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY. ALTHOUGH THE
INDUSTRIAL PLANT OF TAIWAN IS SMALL IN COMPARISON WITH THAT OF
JAPAN,ITS VERY EXISTENCE IN THE INDUSTRIALLY BACKWARD FAR EAST
GIVES IT A SIGNIFICANCE OUT OF PROPORTION TO ITS ACTUAL SIZE.
台灣不具備任何顯著數量的戰略物資任也沒有一個大的工業潛力。不過在島上，將是一個經濟資產 ，對任何佔領國來說不是一項負債。台灣目前生產可供出口，水稻盈餘，糖等食物，在中國或日本缺糧經濟體裡，可以發揮重要作用。如果有足夠的肥料是可利用，農業生產可能大大的增加。 雖然台灣植物產業發展與是與日本相比是較小，其本身的存在，在工業落後的遠東地區，其意義上與實際尺寸是不成比例的。
IF TAIWAN'S RICE AND SUGAR WERE AVAILABLE TO JAPAN,IT WOULD
LIGHTEN THE US BURDENIN THAT AREA BY PARTIALLY RELIEVING JAPAN'S
DEPENDENCE ON MORE DISTANT AND LESS DEPENDABLESOURCES IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA. THE TEXTILES AND OTHER CONSUMER GOODS AS
WELL AS INDUSTRIALEQUIPMENT WHICH JAPAN COULD SUPPLY TAIWAN
COULD BE PROFITABLY ABSORBED BY THE ISLAND'S ECONOMY. THUS IT IS
VERY PROBABLE THAT THE SEPARATION OF THE ECONOMY OF TAIWAN FROM
THE CHINESE MAINLAND AND THE RE-ORIENTATION OF THAT ECONOMY
TOWARD JAPAN WOULD UNDER PRESENTCIRCUMSTANCE BE BENEFICIAL
TO TAIWAN,JAPAN,AND THE US.
如果台灣的米，糖都可被日本使用，這將減輕美國負擔該區通過部分緩解日本的依賴對在東南亞更加遙遠和不準確的來源。紡織及其他消費品以及工業設備，日本可以供應台灣可盈利的吸收島內經 濟。因此，它是非常可能，根據現在台灣對日本的情況經濟從中國大陸的分離及重新定位該經濟體將是對台灣，日本和美國有益的。
2. INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF TAIWAN.
台灣國際地位
AT THE PRESENT TIME TAIWAN IS NOT LEGALLY A PART OF THE CHINESE
REPUBLIC. ITS STATUSREMAINS TO BE DETERMINED IN THE PEACE TREATY
WITH JAPAN. THE ISLAND HAD, HOWEVER, BEENUNDER CHINESE
ADMINISTRATION SINCE THE JAPANESE SURRENDER IN 1945. CHINA'S
POSITION IN TAIWAN RESETS ON (1) MILITARY CONTROL,AND
(2) THE CAIRO DECLARATION OF NOVEMBER 1943,IN WHICH THE US AND
THE UK AS WELL AS CHINA ANNOUNCED THEIR PURPOSE TO RESTORE
TAIWAN AND THE PESCADORES TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA. THE US
AND UK REAFFIRMED THE CAIRO DECLARATION AT POTSDAM ON 26 JULY
1945. SUBSEQUENTLY THE USSR ADHERED TO THE POTSDAM PROCLAMATION,
AND THEREBY TO THE CAIRO DECLARATION. HOWEVER,NEITHER THE US,
NOR ANY OTHER POWER,HAS FORMALLY RECOGNIZED THE ANNEXATION
BY CHINA OF TAIWAN,THE LEGAL STATUS OF WHICH,UNTIL THE
CONCLUSION OF A JAPANESE PEACE TREATY,IS THAT OF AN OCCUPIED
TERRITORY IN WHICH THE US,AS WELL AS THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS
IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN,STILL HAVE PROPRIETARY INTERESTS.
在目前台灣在法律上並不是中華民國的一部分。其地位確定仍有待與日本締結和平條約。這島有的，不管如何，自從在日本人1945年投降後，在中國行政管理以來，中國的地位在台灣會重設在 (1) 軍事控制 ， 和 (2) 1943年11月開羅宣言，其中，美國和英國以及中國宣布他們的目的來恢復台灣及澎湖列島給中華民國。美國和英國在波茨坦1945年7月26日重申了開羅宣言。 蘇聯隨後堅持以波茨坦公告， 並由此開羅宣言。然而，無論是美國，也沒有任何其他權力，已經正式確認了中國吞併台灣，其中的法律地位，直至達到對日和約締結前，是其中被美國佔領的領土，以及在對日抗戰中的其他參與者，依然有的專有權益。
3. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN TAIWAN
台灣可能的發展情況
THERE IS STRONG SENTIMENT IN TAIWAN FAVORING AUTONOMY,BUT THE
SITUATION IS COMPLICATED BY THE CONFLICTING INTERESTS OF THE NATIVE
TAIWANESE AND CHINESE NATIONALIST ELEMENTS. THE TAIWANESE BITTERLY
RESENT THE PERFORMANCE OF THE NATIONALIST ADMINISTRATION ON TAIWAN
SINCE VJ-DAY. THE CHINESE RULES HAVE EXPLOITED THE NATIVE POPULATION
TO THE LIMIT,WITHOUT REGARD FOR THEIR WELFARE OR THE PRESERVATION
OF THE ISLAND'S RESOURCES.THE EXPLOSIVE NATUREOF THE TAIWANESE
PROBLEM WAS DRAMATICALLY DEMONSTRATED IN THE ABORTIVE INSURRECTION
OF 1947.
在台灣有強烈贊成自治之情緒，但因本土台灣人和國民政府利益衝突而情況複雜。自從第二次世界大 戰對日戰爭勝利纪念日台灣痛恨國民黨行政部門在台灣的行為，中國人規則已經剝削本地人口到了極限，而不考慮他們的福利或島上的資源的保存。台灣問題爆炸性的大幅體現在1947年失敗的起義中。
a.TAIWANESE ASPIRATIONS AND CAPABILITIES.
台灣的訴求和能力
THE NATIVE POPULATION OF TAIWAN WOULD WELCOME RELEASE FROM
THEIR DOMINATION BY MAINLAND CHINESE. THE TAIWANESE PROBABLY
DO NOT HAVE STRONG ASPIRATIONS FOR IMMEDIATE INDEPENDENCE,
BUT COULD BE EXPECTED TO FAVOR A TRUSTEESHIP STATUS UNDER
THE UN OR SOME FROM OF US PROTECTORATE.
台灣本地出生的人口很歡迎從中國大陸的統治中解放。台灣可能沒有強烈的訴求即時獨立，但可以預期傾向於成為一個聯合國託管或美國保護狀態。
A SUCCESSFUL TAIWANESE REBELLION AGAINST THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT
IN THE NEAR THE FUTUREIS QUITE IMPROBABLE,OWING TO LACK OF EFFECTIVE
ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP AND THE PRESENCEOF NATIONALIST MILITARY
FORCES ON THE ISLAND. IT IS QUITE PROBABLE,HOWEVER,THAT THE
TAIWANESE MAY RESORT TO ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND SABOTAGE AT ANY
TIME IN PROTEST AGAINST THE CURRENT INFLUX OF MAINLAND CHINESE.
THESE OUTBREAKS MAY BE PROMPTED,NOT SO MUCH BY HOPE OF SUCCESS AS
BY A DESIRE TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF WORLD OPINION TO THE TAIWANESE
PROBLEM. FURTHERMORE,EVEN IF A NON-COMMUNIST TAIWANESE REGIME
WERE ESTABLISHED,ITS ABILITY OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME TO WITHSTAND
PRESSURE FROM THE COMMUNIST-DOMINATED MAINLAND WOULD BESLIGHT,
IN VIEW OF THE LACK OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERIENCE OF POTENTIAL TAIWANESE
LEADERS ANDTHE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD CONFRONT THEIR REGIME.
一個成功的台灣人在不久的將來反抗中國政府是相當不可能的。這是很可能由於組織缺乏有效的領導，還有國民黨軍隊在島上的存在。不管如何，那些台灣人可能會訴諸暴力和破壞行動在任何時間點上 以對抗當前中國大陸的湧入。
這些爆發可能會提倡，這些爆發可能會提倡，做為一個期望世界輿論注意台灣問題成功的希望不大。此外，即使如果台灣人建立了非共產主義政權，隨著在一段時間內，共產主義控制的大陸有可能將長期的略為施壓，有鑑於潛在的台灣領導人缺乏政府工作經驗和經濟問題 ，這都是政權將會面對的。
b.NATIONALIST REMNANTS IN TAIWAN.
國民黨的殘餘在台灣
WITH THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE NATIONAL GORVENMENT ON THE
MAINLAND CHINESE NATIONALIST LEADERS HAVE MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN AS A BASE FOR CONTINUED RESISTANCE AND
A FINAL REFUGE. THE FAMILIES AND PROPERTIES OF A NUMBER OF HIGHLY PLACED
NATIONALISTS AS WELL AS SOME IMPORTANT OFFICIALS HAVE ALREADY MOVED
TO TAIWAN. IN ADDITION, THE GOVERNMENT MAY HAVE AS SIX DIVISIONS NOW
IN TRAINING ON THE ISLAND,A NUMBER WHICH MAY BE INCREASED BY WITHDRAWAL
OF ADDITIONAL TROOPS FROM THE MAINLAND.THE EQUIPMENT AND
AMMUNITION SUPPLIES OF THESE TROOPS HAVE BEEN AUGMENTED. MOREOVER,
TAIWAN IS BEINGPREPARED AS THE PRINCIPAL BASE FOR THE CHINESE NAVY AND
AIR FORCE.
隨著中國國民黨領導人國家政府在大陸的解體並已在台灣取得重大進展作為後續性和最終的避難基 地發展。一些身居高位的民族主義者以及重要官員的家屬和財產已經移往台灣。此外，政府可能有六個師現在在島上培訓，有一些數量可能從內地增加撤回增派部隊。這些部隊的裝備和彈藥物資已得到增強。另外，台灣地區正在準備成為中國海軍和空軍的主要基地。
SOME NATIONALIST ELEMENTS APPARENTLY CONTEMPLATE CONTINUING
RESISTANCE TO THE COMMUNISTS FROM THE SOUTHEAST PROVINCES OF
THE MAINLAND,PERHAPS COORDINATED WITH OTHER RESISTANCE
OFFERED BY NON-COMMUNIST ELEMENTS IN THE SOUTHWEST AND
WESTERN PROVINCES. IN THIS PLAN,TAIWAN WILL SERVER AS A PRINCIPAL
MILITARY AND ECONOMIC BASE,AND, AS A LAST RESORT,THE
SEAT OF A RUMP NATIONAL GOVERNMENT DRIVEN OFF THE MAINLAND.
THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO TAIWANIS INDICATED BY THE RECENT OF
FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF CHEN CHENG AS GOVERNOR.THERE ARE MANY
INDICATIONS THAT CHIANG KAI-SHEK,WHO STILL RETAINS THE TITLE OF
PRESIDENT,MAY HIMSELF MOVE TO TAIWAN.NATIONALIST LEADERS HAVE
PUBLICLY PROCLAIMED THEIR INTENTION OF MAKING THE
ISLAND AN ANTI-COMMUNIST BASTION FOR THE REJUVENATION OF THE
CHINESE NATION,AND HAVE PRIVATELY SUGGESTED TO US OFFICIALS
THAT ECA AID BE DIVERTED THERE,AND THAT TRADE RELATIONS
BETWEEN JAPAN AND TAIWAN BE RESUMED.
一些民族主義分子顯然是考慮持續抵抗來自大陸東南諸省的共產黨主義，也許是與其他在西南和西部省份非共產主義因素提供的抵抗配合。在這個規劃中， 台灣將作為主要的軍事和經濟基地服務，作為一個處在最末端的國民政府回歸內地的最後手段。近期前任行政者陳誠作為州長顯示了依附於台灣的重要性，有很多跡象表明蔣介石在世衛組織仍保留總統的頭銜他本人可以移動到台灣。民族主義的領導人已經公開宣稱，為了中華民族的振興他們打算在島上製作反共堡壘，與私下建議美國官員說，資助經濟合 作協議已經轉向何方，還有日本和台灣之間的貿易關係恢復。
A NATIONALIST RUMP GOVERNMENT ON TAIWAN CANNOT BE RELIED
UPON TO PREVENT THE COMMUNISTS FROM GAINING CONTROL OF
THE ISLAND. THE NATIONALIST ARMY,NAVY, AND AIR FORCE ARE NOT ONLY
INEFFICIENT,BUT THEIR LOYALTY AND WILL TO FIGHT ARE QUESTIONABLE.
IN ADDITION,SUCH A REFUGEE REGIME WOULD BE UNSTABLE BECAUSE
OF THE HOSTILITY OF THE LOCAL POPULATION WHICH,
IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES,WOULD BE INCREASINGLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO
COMMUNIST INFLUENCE.
不能依賴在台灣國民黨政府的殘餘來防止共產黨人獲取島嶼的控制。 國民黨陸軍，海軍和空軍不僅效率低下，而且他們的忠誠和戰鬥意志值得懷疑的。此外，這樣的難民制度將是不穩定的，因為在當地居民有 敵意的情況下，將會越來越容易受到共產黨影響。
c. COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES WITH RESPECT TO TAIWAN
中共主義的能力與給予台灣的尊重
ALTHOUGH COMMUNIST STRENGTH ON TAIWAN HAS NOT YET
ATTAINED SIGNIFICANT PROPORTIONS,IT IS APPARENT THAT THE
COMMUNISTS PLAN TO EXTEND THEIR CONTROL TO THE ISLAND;
THEY HAVE, IN FACT, NAMED TAIWAN AMONG THE SIXTEEN MAJOR
CENTERS OF RESISTANCE WHICH THEY INTEND TO OCCUPY. IN THE
NEXT FEW MONTH THE COMMUNISTS MAY ACQUIRE MAINLAND PORTS
AND SHIPPINGWHICH WILL PROVIDE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A
MILITARY ASSAULT ON TAIWAN, BUT THIS COULDPROBABLY BE REPULSED
BY THE NATIONALISTS SO LONG AS THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE REMAINED LOYAL.
THE COMMUNISTS,THEREFORE, WILL PROBABLY TRY TO EXTEND
THEIR INFLUENCE AMONG THE TAIWANESEBY INFILTRATION AND BY POLITICAL
MEANS,INSTEAD OF ATTEMPTING TO TAKE THE ISLAND BY DIRECT
ASSAULT. THROUGH INFILTRATION, THE COMMUNISTS COULD PROVIDE
EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND ARMS FOR THE TAIWANESE INSURGENTS;AND
THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS, SUCH AS OFFERING AMNESTY OR EVEN REWARDS
TO NATIONALIST LEADERS ASSISTING A COMMUNIST TRIUMPH,THE NATIONALIST
WILL TO RESIST COULD BE REDUCED. THUS, THE CHINESE NATIONALIST
ADMINISTRATION, UNLESS SUPPORTED BY US MILITARY FORCE,WOULD
EVENTUALLY BE DEPOSED BY A COMMUNIST-LED NATIVES MOVEMENT.
儘管這裡，共產主義在台灣尚未達到很高比例的強度，很顯然，中共有計劃將延伸其對島嶼的控制。其實他們有指名台灣之間十六個主要的抵抗中心且他們打算佔領。在未來的幾個月內共產黨可能取得內地的港口和航運，這將會為進行軍事進攻台灣提供機會，但是這可能可能被國民黨擊退只要海軍和空軍保持忠誠。共產主義也因此，可能會試圖通過政治手段滲入台灣人之間擴展自己的影響力，而不是試圖直接攻擊奪下島嶼。透過滲透，共產黨可以對台灣的叛亂分子提供有效的領導和武裝;並通過政治手段，如提供大赦 甚至獎勵協助民族主義領導人回歸共產主義，這樣可以減少民族主義的抵抗意志。中國的民族主義管理，除非美國的軍事力量支持，不然最終會被共產黨領導的同鄉運動推翻。
THERE IS ALSO SOME PROSPECT THAT THE COMMUNISTS MIGHT
ACQUIRE CONTROL OVER TAIWAN BY POLITICAL MEANS ALONE,
THOUGH A NATIONALIST-COMMUNIST AGREEMENT AS A PART OF PEACE
NEGOTIATIONS ON A NATIONAL OR LOCAL SCALE. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT
THE COMMUNISTS WOULD AGREE TO ANY SETTLEMENT ON A NATIONAL
SCALE UNLESS THE COMMUNISTS, BY ITS TERMS, WERE ASSURED
CONTROL OVER THE GOVERNMENT MILITARY FORCES AND RESOURCES
IN TAIWAN.
也有一些勘察表示，共產黨可能透過政治手段獲得台灣單方面控制，雖然國共協議作為一個國家尺度和平談判範圍的部分。共產黨是不太可能會同意任何殖民在全國范圍內，除非共產黨有任何和解且根據其條款獲得保證可以控制在台灣的政府軍隊和資源。
ASSUMING US INACTIVITY,TAIWAN WILL EVENTUALLY BUT PROBABLY NOT IMMEDIATELY PASS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS.
假設美國不做任何處置，台灣雖然不會立即但終將可能轉到中國共產黨的控制下。
4. CONSEQUENCES OF US MEASURES TO DENY TAIWAN COMMUNIST DOMINATION.
美國的措施來拒絕中共統治台灣的結論
ANY US MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT A PROGRAM OF DENYING TAIWAN TO EVENTUAL COMMUNIST DOMINATIONWOULD HAVE SOME UNFAVORABLE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES.
美國任何計劃措施落實防止台灣最終造成由中共統治產生出一些不利政治的後果
a. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE US,IN ANY COURSE OF ACTION,
CAN AVOID INCURRING THE HOSTILITY OF EITHER THE
CHINESE NATIONALISTS OR THE TAIWANESE,EACH OF WHOM
WOULD RESENT AND RESIST ANY US EFFORT TO SUPPORT
THE OTHER. US ACQUIESCENCE IN NATIONALIST CONTROL
OF TAIWAN IN RESENTED BY THE TAIWANESE. POSITIVE
SUPPORT TO THE NATIONALISTS WOULD PROBABLY DRIVE THE
TAIWANESE TOWARD THE COMMUNISTS. ON THE OTHER HAND,
US SUPPORT TO TAIWANESE ASPIRATIONS WOULD REQUIRE
TAKING OVER AUTHORITY FROM THE ESTABLISHED NATIONALIST
REGIME.
看起來美國在採取任何行動上，不太可能避免招致無論是中國國民黨或台灣的敵意，任何一方將怨恨和抵制美國對任一方的努力支持。美國默許國民黨控制的台灣造成台灣人的不滿。正面支持國民黨很可能會帶動台灣人轉向共產黨。在另一方面，美國支持台灣人的請求，要求接管管理局偏離了既定的國民黨政權。
b. US MEASURES TO EFFECT THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN TAIWAN
WOULD PROVIDE THE USSR AND THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS
WITH ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THEIR ANTI-US PROPAGANDA.
美國預計台灣歷史事件的進程是將提供蘇聯與中共的額外材料其抗美宣傳思想。
c. ANTI-US SENTIMENT PROBABLY WOULD INCREASE IN CHINA,
WERE THE RETURN OF TAIWAN TO THEREPUBLIC OF CHINA IS
ACCEPTED AS A FACT,ALTHOUGH THE EXTENT WOULD VARY
DEPENDING ON THE NATURE OF THE MEASURES ADOPTED BY
THE US. THIS ISSUE COULD WIN INCREASED POPULAR SUPPORT
FOR A COMMUNIST REGIME IN CHINA.
反美情緒在中國可能會加大，但回頭看中華民國在台灣已為接受事實，雖然範圍會有所不同，這取決於美國規劃後通過的自然衍生的措施。此問題可能針對中共政權在中國贏得民眾的支持增加。
d. IT WOULD PROBABLY PRECLUDE THE US MAINTAINING
NORMAL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR RELATIONSHIPS
WITH A COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN CHINA,IF SUCH RELATIONS
WERE DESIRED.THIS WOULD CERTAINLY BY THE CASE IF THE
US SUPPORTED OR WAS ACCUSED OF SUPPORTING A RUMP
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT ON TAIWAN.
它可能會妨礙美國維持正常在中國共產黨政府下的外交和領事關係，如果這種關係是需要的。這種情況下如果美國支持必會受案或者被指控支持在台灣的國民政府殘餘。
e. DEPENDING ON THE NATURE OF THE US PROGRAM,THE TAIWANESE
PROBLEM MIGHT BE RAISED IN THE UN TO THE EMBARRASSMENT OF
THE US.
這取決於美國計劃的性質，台灣問題可能會引發在聯合國對美國的尷尬。
ON THE OTHER HAND, SOME COURSES OF US ACTION MIGHT
PRODUCE RESULTS BENEFICIAL TO US INTERESTS. THE WILL
TO RESIST COMMUNISM IN JAPAN, IN KOREA, IN THE PHILIPPINES
AND ELSEWHERE THROUGHOUT THE FAR EAST, INCLUDING THE
SOUTHEAST COASTAL AREAS OF CHINA,MIGHT BE STRENGTHENED.
A DEFINITE US PROGRAM TOWARD TAIWAN WOULD BE VIEWED AS
AN INDICATION OF US DETERMINATION TO CHECK THE ADVANCE OF
COMMUNISM IN THE FAR EAST WHEREVER PRACTICABLE TO DO SO.
FAVORABLE REACTION MIGHT DEVELOP IF THE US PROGRAM WERE
DEVELOPED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO SECURE LOCAL STABILITY
AND CONTENTMENT IN TAIWAN AND THE SATISFY TAIWANESE
SENTIMENT IN FAVOR OF AUTONOMY. THE PROGRAM WOULD
HAVE TO BE SUPPLEMENTED BY AN INFORMATIONAL
CAMPAIGN DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE US
WAS FAVORABLE TO FAR EASTERN NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS.
IF NOT, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES THROUGHOUT THE FAR
EAST COULD BE DISTINCTLY UNFAVORABLE TO THE US.
而另一方面，美國其中一些科目的行動中可能會產生有利於美國的利益結果。意在抵禦共產主義在日本，韓國，菲律賓和在整個遠東地區別處，包括中國東南沿海地區，則可能得到加強。一個美國對台灣的明確計劃將被視為跡象顯示美國決心來檢查共產主義在遠東前進的可行性。如果美國方案制訂以這樣的方式作為確保地方穩定和繁榮在台灣和符合台灣人氣氛贊成台灣自治可能會是有利的反應發展，本計劃將不得不補充另一個信息選舉設計旨在表明美國志向有利於遠東國。如果沒有，其整個遠東地區的政治後果可能是明顯的不利於美國。
5. CONCLUSION.
結論
THE SITUATION IN TAIWAN IS STEADILY GROWING MORE
CRITICAL FOR THE US BECAUSE OF TAIWANESE DISCONTENT
, CHINESE NATIONALIST PREPARATION OF THE ISLAND AS A
LAST BASTION, AND INCREASING CHINESE COMMUNIST INTEREST
IN AND CAPABILITIES TOWARD THE ISLAND. ASSUMING
US INACTIVITY,TAIWAN WILL EVENTUALLY PASS TO THE
CONTROL OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST. THE STRATEGIC
IMPLICATIONS TO US SECURITY OF SUCH A DEVELOPMENT
WOULD BE SERIOUSLY UNFAVORABLE. IN ANY US PROGRAM TO
PREVENT COMMUNIST CONTROL OF TAIWAN, THE ADVANTAGES
TO BE GAINED THEREBY FROM THE STRATEGIC MILITARY
VIEWPOINT WOULD HAVE TO BE WEIGHED AGAINST UNFAVORABLE
POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES, THE EXTENT OF WHICH WOULD
VARY DEPENDING UPON THE SELECTION AND TIMING OF
MEASURES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAM.
因為台灣人的不滿因此目前對美國來說更為重要的是讓台灣的情況穩定增長，該島作為中國國民黨編制最後的堡壘，並增加中國共產黨對該島嶼的權益和能力。假設美國不做任何處置，台灣雖然不會立即但終將可能轉到中國共產黨的控制下。這樣美國安全戰略的發展將會受到嚴重不利的影響。 在任何美國方案裡，防止台灣不讓共產黨控制，從獲得軍事戰略觀點上的優勢來看，將不得不權衡不利的政治後果，其中範圍會有 所不同，這取決於措施執行本方案的選擇和時間。
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看完了有何感想??政客天天吵,還不都是為了自己, 有誰真心為百姓想過?除了騙,還是騙,百姓什麼都不知道,做牛做馬操勞一生,然後呢?什麼也沒有,22k,物價上漲,國際上沒地位,這是....地獄嗎?難到台灣人真的就只能這樣?醒醒吧台灣人,是時候該團結了,放下那所謂的自私, 一起來想辦法幫助我們自己脫離地獄吧,不要再被那些自私的政客洗腦,因為他們說的都是屁....
一點實際意義都沒有.......
美國CIA解密文件 ORE 39-49 pdf檔：
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000258551.pdf
本社團下載，美國CIA解密文件 ORE 39-49 pdf檔：
https://www.facebook.com/groups/547082858734644/556947681081495/
原翻譯作者：
https://www.facebook.com/notes/yamato-sasaki/台灣人悲慘的歷史真相由美國cia來告訴你cia解密文件ore-39-49/305190999649712
Elijah Liam 寫於 2014年6月9日 21:36
台灣人悲慘的歷史真相由美國CIA來告訴你.....CIA解密文件ORE 39-49
這是美國CIA解密文件,敘說了當初台灣在國際上是如何的"嶄露頭角",如何的被利用,還有
原來的台灣住民如何的被欺負....看完了...會心酸,會悲哀...這就是....台灣人....
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CIA官方網站引用網址:
http://www.foia.cia.gov/search-results?search_api_views_fulltext=ORE+39-49&field_collection=
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
文件內容如下
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN TAIWAN
中情局歷史回顧程序的發布在全台灣發展情況的可能性
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
發布通知
1.THIS COPY OF THIS PUBLICATION AND USE OF THE RECIPIENT DESIGNATED
ON THE FRONT COVER AND OF INDIVIDUALS UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE
RECIPLENT'S OFFICE WHO REQUIRE THE INFORMATION FOR THE PERFORMANCE
OF THEIR DUTIES. FURTHER DISSEMINATION ELSEWHERE IN THE DEPARTMENT
TO OTHER OFFICES WHICH REQUIRE THE INFORMATION FOR THE PERFORMANCE
OF OFFICICAL DUTIES MAY BE AUTHORIZED BY THE FOLLOWING:
此副本和封面上的指定收件人與司法管轄權下人士的接受者們,在辦公室裡被要求履行此訊息職責之人員.未來發布其他地方與需要的信息其他職位系用於官方履職情況可授權情況如下：
a. SPECIAL ASSIATANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR RESEARCH AND
INTELLIGENCE, FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
特別助理國務卿用於研究和情報，致國務院
b. DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, GS, USA, FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
情報指揮者，GS，美國陸軍部
c. CHIEF, NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
首席指揮官，海軍情報
d. DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, USAF, FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
情報指揮者，美國空軍
e. DIRECTOR OF SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE, AEC, FOR THE ATOMIC ENERGY
COMMISSION
國家安全情報指揮者，美國原子能原委員會
f. DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, JOINT STAFF, FOR THE JOINT STAFF
代理情報指揮，聯合單位
g. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION, CIA, FOR ANY
OTHER DEPARTMENT OF AGENCY
助理指揮收集與發佈，CIA
2. THIS COPY MAY BE EITHER RETAINED OR DESTROYED BY BURING IN ACCORDANCE
WITH APPLICABLE SECURITY REGULATIONS, OR RETURNED TO THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY BY ARRANGEMENT WITH THE OFFICE OF COLLECTION AND
DISSEMINATION,CIA.
按照適用的安全法規這個副本可以是保留還是銷毀埋在，或退還給中央情報局通過協議安排與辦公室收集和傳播，美國中央情報局。
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN TAIWAN
台灣可能的發展情況
SUMMARY
摘要
1. COMMUNIST CONTROL OF TAIWAN AND CONSEQUENT SOVIET ACCESS TO THE
ISLAND IN WARTIME WOULD HAVE SERIOUSLY UNFAVORABLE IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE US.
共產制度控制台灣還有隨之而來的蘇聯訪問在這個戰爭時期將嚴重對美國產生不良的影響。
2.FROM THE LEGAL STANDPOINT,TAIWAN IS NOT PART OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
PENDING A JAPANESE PEACE TREATY,THE ISLAND REMAINS OCCUPIED TERRITORY
IN WHICH THE US HAS PROPRIETARY INTERESTS.
從法律的角度來看，台灣不是中國的一部分共和國。有待一個對日和約，美國在島上保持佔有領土專有權益。
3.THE NATIVE POPULATION OF TAIWAN WOULD WELCOME RELEASE FROM CHINESE
CONTROL,BUT IS NOT NOW STRONG ENOUGH TO STAGE A SUCCESSFUL REVOLT.
THE TAIWANESE AREINCREASINGLY RESTIVE,HOWEVER,BECAUSE OF THE INFLUX
OF NATIONALIST OFFICIALS AND MILITARY FORCES, AND WILL BECOME MORE
SUSCEPTIBLE TO COMMUNIST INFLUENCE
在台灣出生的本地人口很歡迎從中國人控制中解放，但現在未強大到足以上演一出成功的反叛。 台灣人越來越難以控制，但是，由於國民黨官員的湧入， 軍事力量，將會變得更加容易受到 共產黨影響
4.ASSUMING US INACTIVITY,TAIWAN WILL EVENTUALLY PASS UNDER THE CONTROL
OF THECHINESE COMMUNISTS. IN ANY US PROGRAM TO PREVENT THIS, THE
ADVANTAGES TO BE GAINED FROM THE STRATEGIC MILITARY VIEWPOINT WOULD
HAVE TO BE WEIGHED AGAINST UNFAVORABLE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES,THE
EXTENT OF WHICH WOULD VARY DEPENDING UPON THE SELECTION AND TIMING
OF MEASURES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAM.
假設美國沒有任何行動，台灣終會轉移到的中國共產黨人的控制下。在任何美國防止這種情況的方案中，從獲得軍事戰略觀點上的優勢來看，將不得不權衡不利的政治後果，其中範圍會有所不同，這取決於措施執行本方案的選擇和時間。
AT THE PRESENT TIME THERE APPEARS TO BE NO REALISTIC MEANS FOR PREVENTING
THE EARLY ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMUNIST-DOMINATED GOVERNMENT OVER ALL
CHINA. IT CAN BE ASSUMEDTHAT SUCH A GOVERNMENT WOULD STRIVE TO
ESTABLISH ITS AUTHORITY IN TAIWAN. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT EVEN NOW THE
CHINESE COMMUNISTS ARE SEEKING TO EXTEND THEIR CONTROL TO THAT ISLAND,
AND THEY MAY BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE THESE EFFORTS. THE CHINESE
COMMUNISTS WILL NOT FINALLY SECURE THEIR PROSPECTIVE VICTORY IN CHINA
UNTIL THEY CONTROL TAIWAN, INASMUCH AS THE PRESENT NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
IS NOW DEVELOPINGTAIWAN AS A PRINCIPAL BASE FOR CONTINUING THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST COMMUNISTS WILL REMAIN PRO-SOVIET, AND THAT A GOVERNMENT
ESTABLISHED BY THEM WOULD BE A WARTIME ALLY OF THE USSR
用手段防止一個早期成立的共產黨政府對所有中國的控制，以目前的時間似乎是不可實現。我們可以假設，這樣的政府將努力樹立其權威在台灣。有證據表明，即使是現在中共正試圖擴大 他們對那個島的控制 ，還有預計他們可能將會繼續這些努力。中共將沒有確保他們在中國最終的 前瞻性勝利直到他們控制台灣，作為生死關頭的當今政府現正以發展台灣為主要基礎，來繼續對 抗共產黨人的持續親蘇，並因此確立他們的政府將是一個戰時的蘇聯盟友。
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN TAIWAN
台灣可能的發展情況
1. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF TAIWAN TO THE US.
台灣對美國的戰略重要性。
THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST CONTROL OF TAIWAN
WITH THE PROSPECT OF CONSEQUENT SOVIET TO THE ISLAND, WOULD BE
SERIOUSLY UNFAVORABLE TO THE SECURITY OF THE US.
預測中國共產黨控制台灣與隨之而來的蘇聯在島上的戰略影響，將嚴重不利於美國的安全。
COMMUNIST VICTORIES IN CHINA WILL PROBABLY IN THE NEAR FUTURE DENY
US ACCESS TO ALL THE STRATEGICALLY VALUABLE AREAS OF THE CHINESE
MAINLAND. THIS CIRCUMSTANCE WILL INCREASE THE POTENTIAL VALUE TO
THE US OF TAIWAN, IN THE EVENT OF WAR, AS AN AREA FOR STAGING TROOPS
,AS A BASE FOR STRATEGIC AIR OPERATIONS,AS A NAVAL BASE FOR CONTROLLING
SEA ROUTES BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE SOUTH,AND AS AN IMPORTANT LINK IN
THE US DEFENSE CHINA OF MUTUALLYSUPPORTING ISLANDS.
中國共產黨的勝利很可能會在不久的將來否認美國進入中國大陸的所有戰略價值的領域。 這種情況下會增加台灣對美國的潛在價值，在戰爭情況下，如一個區域用於分段部隊， 作為戰略的空軍行動基地，為海軍基地用於控制日本和南方之間的海上航線，而作為一個重要 橋樑在美國防禦中國中相互支援的島嶼。
ASSUMING THAT A NEW COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN CHINA WILL BE ORIENTED
TOWARD THE USSR,AND WOULD BE A WARTIME SOVIET ALLY, COMMUNIST
CONTROL OF TAIWAN WOULD ALLOW SOVIET ACCESS TO THE ISLAND IN THE
EVENT OF WAR. MILITARY EXPLOITATION OF TAIWAN BY THE USSR WOULD
INCREASE SOVIET CAPABILITY FOR DISRUPTING SEA AND AIR COMMUNICATIONS
IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC AREA, AND FOR CONDUCTING OPERATIONS AGAINST
THE RYUKYUS AND THE PHILIPPINES.
假設在中國共產黨新政權以蘇聯為方向，並在戰時為蘇聯的盟友，共產黨控制的台灣將允許蘇聯在戰爭情形下登陸島上。台灣由蘇聯軍事開發利用將增加蘇維埃在西太平洋地區擾亂海上和空中交通的能力，和打擊琉球群島及菲律賓的指揮行動。
TAIWAN DOES NOT POSSESS ANY SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES OF STRATEGIC
MATERIALS NOR DOES IT HAVE A LARGE INDUSTRIAL POTENTIAL. THE ISLAND
,NEVERTHELESS, WOULD BE AN ECONOMIC AS-SET RATHER THAN A LIABILITY
TO ANY OCCUPYING POWER. TAIWAN CURRENTLY PRODUCES EXPORTABLE
SURPLUSES OF RICE,SUGAR,AND OTHER FOODS WHICH COULD PLAY AN
IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE FOOD-DEFICIT ECONOMIES OF EITHER CHINA OR
JAPAN. IF SUFFICIENT FERTILIZER WERE AVAILABLE,AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTION COULD BE INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY. ALTHOUGH THE
INDUSTRIAL PLANT OF TAIWAN IS SMALL IN COMPARISON WITH THAT OF
JAPAN,ITS VERY EXISTENCE IN THE INDUSTRIALLY BACKWARD FAR EAST
GIVES IT A SIGNIFICANCE OUT OF PROPORTION TO ITS ACTUAL SIZE.
台灣不具備任何顯著數量的戰略物資任也沒有一個大的工業潛力。不過在島上，將是一個經濟資產 ，對任何佔領國來說不是一項負債。台灣目前生產可供出口，水稻盈餘，糖等食物，在中國或日本缺糧經濟體裡，可以發揮重要作用。如果有足夠的肥料是可利用，農業生產可能大大的增加。 雖然台灣植物產業發展與是與日本相比是較小，其本身的存在，在工業落後的遠東地區，其意義上與實際尺寸是不成比例的。
IF TAIWAN'S RICE AND SUGAR WERE AVAILABLE TO JAPAN,IT WOULD
LIGHTEN THE US BURDENIN THAT AREA BY PARTIALLY RELIEVING JAPAN'S
DEPENDENCE ON MORE DISTANT AND LESS DEPENDABLESOURCES IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA. THE TEXTILES AND OTHER CONSUMER GOODS AS
WELL AS INDUSTRIALEQUIPMENT WHICH JAPAN COULD SUPPLY TAIWAN
COULD BE PROFITABLY ABSORBED BY THE ISLAND'S ECONOMY. THUS IT IS
VERY PROBABLE THAT THE SEPARATION OF THE ECONOMY OF TAIWAN FROM
THE CHINESE MAINLAND AND THE RE-ORIENTATION OF THAT ECONOMY
TOWARD JAPAN WOULD UNDER PRESENTCIRCUMSTANCE BE BENEFICIAL
TO TAIWAN,JAPAN,AND THE US.
如果台灣的米，糖都可被日本使用，這將減輕美國負擔該區通過部分緩解日本的依賴對在東南亞更加遙遠和不準確的來源。紡織及其他消費品以及工業設備，日本可以供應台灣可盈利的吸收島內經 濟。因此，它是非常可能，根據現在台灣對日本的情況經濟從中國大陸的分離及重新定位該經濟體將是對台灣，日本和美國有益的。
2. INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF TAIWAN.
台灣國際地位
AT THE PRESENT TIME TAIWAN IS NOT LEGALLY A PART OF THE CHINESE
REPUBLIC. ITS STATUSREMAINS TO BE DETERMINED IN THE PEACE TREATY
WITH JAPAN. THE ISLAND HAD, HOWEVER, BEENUNDER CHINESE
ADMINISTRATION SINCE THE JAPANESE SURRENDER IN 1945. CHINA'S
POSITION IN TAIWAN RESETS ON (1) MILITARY CONTROL,AND
(2) THE CAIRO DECLARATION OF NOVEMBER 1943,IN WHICH THE US AND
THE UK AS WELL AS CHINA ANNOUNCED THEIR PURPOSE TO RESTORE
TAIWAN AND THE PESCADORES TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA. THE US
AND UK REAFFIRMED THE CAIRO DECLARATION AT POTSDAM ON 26 JULY
1945. SUBSEQUENTLY THE USSR ADHERED TO THE POTSDAM PROCLAMATION,
AND THEREBY TO THE CAIRO DECLARATION. HOWEVER,NEITHER THE US,
NOR ANY OTHER POWER,HAS FORMALLY RECOGNIZED THE ANNEXATION
BY CHINA OF TAIWAN,THE LEGAL STATUS OF WHICH,UNTIL THE
CONCLUSION OF A JAPANESE PEACE TREATY,IS THAT OF AN OCCUPIED
TERRITORY IN WHICH THE US,AS WELL AS THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS
IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN,STILL HAVE PROPRIETARY INTERESTS.
在目前台灣在法律上並不是中華民國的一部分。其地位確定仍有待與日本締結和平條約。這島有的，不管如何，自從在日本人1945年投降後，在中國行政管理以來，中國的地位在台灣會重設在 (1) 軍事控制 ， 和 (2) 1943年11月開羅宣言，其中，美國和英國以及中國宣布他們的目的來恢復台灣及澎湖列島給中華民國。美國和英國在波茨坦1945年7月26日重申了開羅宣言。 蘇聯隨後堅持以波茨坦公告， 並由此開羅宣言。然而，無論是美國，也沒有任何其他權力，已經正式確認了中國吞併台灣，其中的法律地位，直至達到對日和約締結前，是其中被美國佔領的領土，以及在對日抗戰中的其他參與者，依然有的專有權益。
3. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN TAIWAN
台灣可能的發展情況
THERE IS STRONG SENTIMENT IN TAIWAN FAVORING AUTONOMY,BUT THE
SITUATION IS COMPLICATED BY THE CONFLICTING INTERESTS OF THE NATIVE
TAIWANESE AND CHINESE NATIONALIST ELEMENTS. THE TAIWANESE BITTERLY
RESENT THE PERFORMANCE OF THE NATIONALIST ADMINISTRATION ON TAIWAN
SINCE VJ-DAY. THE CHINESE RULES HAVE EXPLOITED THE NATIVE POPULATION
TO THE LIMIT,WITHOUT REGARD FOR THEIR WELFARE OR THE PRESERVATION
OF THE ISLAND'S RESOURCES.THE EXPLOSIVE NATUREOF THE TAIWANESE
PROBLEM WAS DRAMATICALLY DEMONSTRATED IN THE ABORTIVE INSURRECTION
OF 1947.
在台灣有強烈贊成自治之情緒，但因本土台灣人和國民政府利益衝突而情況複雜。自從第二次世界大 戰對日戰爭勝利纪念日台灣痛恨國民黨行政部門在台灣的行為，中國人規則已經剝削本地人口到了極限，而不考慮他們的福利或島上的資源的保存。台灣問題爆炸性的大幅體現在1947年失敗的起義中。
a.TAIWANESE ASPIRATIONS AND CAPABILITIES.
台灣的訴求和能力
THE NATIVE POPULATION OF TAIWAN WOULD WELCOME RELEASE FROM
THEIR DOMINATION BY MAINLAND CHINESE. THE TAIWANESE PROBABLY
DO NOT HAVE STRONG ASPIRATIONS FOR IMMEDIATE INDEPENDENCE,
BUT COULD BE EXPECTED TO FAVOR A TRUSTEESHIP STATUS UNDER
THE UN OR SOME FROM OF US PROTECTORATE.
台灣本地出生的人口很歡迎從中國大陸的統治中解放。台灣可能沒有強烈的訴求即時獨立，但可以預期傾向於成為一個聯合國託管或美國保護狀態。
A SUCCESSFUL TAIWANESE REBELLION AGAINST THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT
IN THE NEAR THE FUTUREIS QUITE IMPROBABLE,OWING TO LACK OF EFFECTIVE
ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP AND THE PRESENCEOF NATIONALIST MILITARY
FORCES ON THE ISLAND. IT IS QUITE PROBABLE,HOWEVER,THAT THE
TAIWANESE MAY RESORT TO ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND SABOTAGE AT ANY
TIME IN PROTEST AGAINST THE CURRENT INFLUX OF MAINLAND CHINESE.
THESE OUTBREAKS MAY BE PROMPTED,NOT SO MUCH BY HOPE OF SUCCESS AS
BY A DESIRE TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF WORLD OPINION TO THE TAIWANESE
PROBLEM. FURTHERMORE,EVEN IF A NON-COMMUNIST TAIWANESE REGIME
WERE ESTABLISHED,ITS ABILITY OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME TO WITHSTAND
PRESSURE FROM THE COMMUNIST-DOMINATED MAINLAND WOULD BESLIGHT,
IN VIEW OF THE LACK OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERIENCE OF POTENTIAL TAIWANESE
LEADERS ANDTHE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD CONFRONT THEIR REGIME.
一個成功的台灣人在不久的將來反抗中國政府是相當不可能的。這是很可能由於組織缺乏有效的領導，還有國民黨軍隊在島上的存在。不管如何，那些台灣人可能會訴諸暴力和破壞行動在任何時間點上 以對抗當前中國大陸的湧入。
這些爆發可能會提倡，這些爆發可能會提倡，做為一個期望世界輿論注意台灣問題成功的希望不大。此外，即使如果台灣人建立了非共產主義政權，隨著在一段時間內，共產主義控制的大陸有可能將長期的略為施壓，有鑑於潛在的台灣領導人缺乏政府工作經驗和經濟問題 ，這都是政權將會面對的。
b.NATIONALIST REMNANTS IN TAIWAN.
國民黨的殘餘在台灣
WITH THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE NATIONAL GORVENMENT ON THE
MAINLAND CHINESE NATIONALIST LEADERS HAVE MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN AS A BASE FOR CONTINUED RESISTANCE AND
A FINAL REFUGE. THE FAMILIES AND PROPERTIES OF A NUMBER OF HIGHLY PLACED
NATIONALISTS AS WELL AS SOME IMPORTANT OFFICIALS HAVE ALREADY MOVED
TO TAIWAN. IN ADDITION, THE GOVERNMENT MAY HAVE AS SIX DIVISIONS NOW
IN TRAINING ON THE ISLAND,A NUMBER WHICH MAY BE INCREASED BY WITHDRAWAL
OF ADDITIONAL TROOPS FROM THE MAINLAND.THE EQUIPMENT AND
AMMUNITION SUPPLIES OF THESE TROOPS HAVE BEEN AUGMENTED. MOREOVER,
TAIWAN IS BEINGPREPARED AS THE PRINCIPAL BASE FOR THE CHINESE NAVY AND
AIR FORCE.
隨著中國國民黨領導人國家政府在大陸的解體並已在台灣取得重大進展作為後續性和最終的避難基 地發展。一些身居高位的民族主義者以及重要官員的家屬和財產已經移往台灣。此外，政府可能有六個師現在在島上培訓，有一些數量可能從內地增加撤回增派部隊。這些部隊的裝備和彈藥物資已得到增強。另外，台灣地區正在準備成為中國海軍和空軍的主要基地。
SOME NATIONALIST ELEMENTS APPARENTLY CONTEMPLATE CONTINUING
RESISTANCE TO THE COMMUNISTS FROM THE SOUTHEAST PROVINCES OF
THE MAINLAND,PERHAPS COORDINATED WITH OTHER RESISTANCE
OFFERED BY NON-COMMUNIST ELEMENTS IN THE SOUTHWEST AND
WESTERN PROVINCES. IN THIS PLAN,TAIWAN WILL SERVER AS A PRINCIPAL
MILITARY AND ECONOMIC BASE,AND, AS A LAST RESORT,THE
SEAT OF A RUMP NATIONAL GOVERNMENT DRIVEN OFF THE MAINLAND.
THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO TAIWANIS INDICATED BY THE RECENT OF
FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF CHEN CHENG AS GOVERNOR.THERE ARE MANY
INDICATIONS THAT CHIANG KAI-SHEK,WHO STILL RETAINS THE TITLE OF
PRESIDENT,MAY HIMSELF MOVE TO TAIWAN.NATIONALIST LEADERS HAVE
PUBLICLY PROCLAIMED THEIR INTENTION OF MAKING THE
ISLAND AN ANTI-COMMUNIST BASTION FOR THE REJUVENATION OF THE
CHINESE NATION,AND HAVE PRIVATELY SUGGESTED TO US OFFICIALS
THAT ECA AID BE DIVERTED THERE,AND THAT TRADE RELATIONS
BETWEEN JAPAN AND TAIWAN BE RESUMED.
一些民族主義分子顯然是考慮持續抵抗來自大陸東南諸省的共產黨主義，也許是與其他在西南和西部省份非共產主義因素提供的抵抗配合。在這個規劃中， 台灣將作為主要的軍事和經濟基地服務，作為一個處在最末端的國民政府回歸內地的最後手段。近期前任行政者陳誠作為州長顯示了依附於台灣的重要性，有很多跡象表明蔣介石在世衛組織仍保留總統的頭銜他本人可以移動到台灣。民族主義的領導人已經公開宣稱，為了中華民族的振興他們打算在島上製作反共堡壘，與私下建議美國官員說，資助經濟合 作協議已經轉向何方，還有日本和台灣之間的貿易關係恢復。
A NATIONALIST RUMP GOVERNMENT ON TAIWAN CANNOT BE RELIED
UPON TO PREVENT THE COMMUNISTS FROM GAINING CONTROL OF
THE ISLAND. THE NATIONALIST ARMY,NAVY, AND AIR FORCE ARE NOT ONLY
INEFFICIENT,BUT THEIR LOYALTY AND WILL TO FIGHT ARE QUESTIONABLE.
IN ADDITION,SUCH A REFUGEE REGIME WOULD BE UNSTABLE BECAUSE
OF THE HOSTILITY OF THE LOCAL POPULATION WHICH,
IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES,WOULD BE INCREASINGLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO
COMMUNIST INFLUENCE.
不能依賴在台灣國民黨政府的殘餘來防止共產黨人獲取島嶼的控制。 國民黨陸軍，海軍和空軍不僅效率低下，而且他們的忠誠和戰鬥意志值得懷疑的。此外，這樣的難民制度將是不穩定的，因為在當地居民有 敵意的情況下，將會越來越容易受到共產黨影響。
c. COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES WITH RESPECT TO TAIWAN
中共主義的能力與給予台灣的尊重
ALTHOUGH COMMUNIST STRENGTH ON TAIWAN HAS NOT YET
ATTAINED SIGNIFICANT PROPORTIONS,IT IS APPARENT THAT THE
COMMUNISTS PLAN TO EXTEND THEIR CONTROL TO THE ISLAND;
THEY HAVE, IN FACT, NAMED TAIWAN AMONG THE SIXTEEN MAJOR
CENTERS OF RESISTANCE WHICH THEY INTEND TO OCCUPY. IN THE
NEXT FEW MONTH THE COMMUNISTS MAY ACQUIRE MAINLAND PORTS
AND SHIPPINGWHICH WILL PROVIDE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A
MILITARY ASSAULT ON TAIWAN, BUT THIS COULDPROBABLY BE REPULSED
BY THE NATIONALISTS SO LONG AS THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE REMAINED LOYAL.
THE COMMUNISTS,THEREFORE, WILL PROBABLY TRY TO EXTEND
THEIR INFLUENCE AMONG THE TAIWANESEBY INFILTRATION AND BY POLITICAL
MEANS,INSTEAD OF ATTEMPTING TO TAKE THE ISLAND BY DIRECT
ASSAULT. THROUGH INFILTRATION, THE COMMUNISTS COULD PROVIDE
EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND ARMS FOR THE TAIWANESE INSURGENTS;AND
THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS, SUCH AS OFFERING AMNESTY OR EVEN REWARDS
TO NATIONALIST LEADERS ASSISTING A COMMUNIST TRIUMPH,THE NATIONALIST
WILL TO RESIST COULD BE REDUCED. THUS, THE CHINESE NATIONALIST
ADMINISTRATION, UNLESS SUPPORTED BY US MILITARY FORCE,WOULD
EVENTUALLY BE DEPOSED BY A COMMUNIST-LED NATIVES MOVEMENT.
儘管這裡，共產主義在台灣尚未達到很高比例的強度，很顯然，中共有計劃將延伸其對島嶼的控制。其實他們有指名台灣之間十六個主要的抵抗中心且他們打算佔領。在未來的幾個月內共產黨可能取得內地的港口和航運，這將會為進行軍事進攻台灣提供機會，但是這可能可能被國民黨擊退只要海軍和空軍保持忠誠。共產主義也因此，可能會試圖通過政治手段滲入台灣人之間擴展自己的影響力，而不是試圖直接攻擊奪下島嶼。透過滲透，共產黨可以對台灣的叛亂分子提供有效的領導和武裝;並通過政治手段，如提供大赦 甚至獎勵協助民族主義領導人回歸共產主義，這樣可以減少民族主義的抵抗意志。中國的民族主義管理，除非美國的軍事力量支持，不然最終會被共產黨領導的同鄉運動推翻。
THERE IS ALSO SOME PROSPECT THAT THE COMMUNISTS MIGHT
ACQUIRE CONTROL OVER TAIWAN BY POLITICAL MEANS ALONE,
THOUGH A NATIONALIST-COMMUNIST AGREEMENT AS A PART OF PEACE
NEGOTIATIONS ON A NATIONAL OR LOCAL SCALE. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT
THE COMMUNISTS WOULD AGREE TO ANY SETTLEMENT ON A NATIONAL
SCALE UNLESS THE COMMUNISTS, BY ITS TERMS, WERE ASSURED
CONTROL OVER THE GOVERNMENT MILITARY FORCES AND RESOURCES
IN TAIWAN.
也有一些勘察表示，共產黨可能透過政治手段獲得台灣單方面控制，雖然國共協議作為一個國家尺度和平談判範圍的部分。共產黨是不太可能會同意任何殖民在全國范圍內，除非共產黨有任何和解且根據其條款獲得保證可以控制在台灣的政府軍隊和資源。
ASSUMING US INACTIVITY,TAIWAN WILL EVENTUALLY BUT PROBABLY NOT IMMEDIATELY PASS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS.
假設美國不做任何處置，台灣雖然不會立即但終將可能轉到中國共產黨的控制下。
4. CONSEQUENCES OF US MEASURES TO DENY TAIWAN COMMUNIST DOMINATION.
美國的措施來拒絕中共統治台灣的結論
ANY US MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT A PROGRAM OF DENYING TAIWAN TO EVENTUAL COMMUNIST DOMINATIONWOULD HAVE SOME UNFAVORABLE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES.
美國任何計劃措施落實防止台灣最終造成由中共統治產生出一些不利政治的後果
a. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE US,IN ANY COURSE OF ACTION,
CAN AVOID INCURRING THE HOSTILITY OF EITHER THE
CHINESE NATIONALISTS OR THE TAIWANESE,EACH OF WHOM
WOULD RESENT AND RESIST ANY US EFFORT TO SUPPORT
THE OTHER. US ACQUIESCENCE IN NATIONALIST CONTROL
OF TAIWAN IN RESENTED BY THE TAIWANESE. POSITIVE
SUPPORT TO THE NATIONALISTS WOULD PROBABLY DRIVE THE
TAIWANESE TOWARD THE COMMUNISTS. ON THE OTHER HAND,
US SUPPORT TO TAIWANESE ASPIRATIONS WOULD REQUIRE
TAKING OVER AUTHORITY FROM THE ESTABLISHED NATIONALIST
REGIME.
看起來美國在採取任何行動上，不太可能避免招致無論是中國國民黨或台灣的敵意，任何一方將怨恨和抵制美國對任一方的努力支持。美國默許國民黨控制的台灣造成台灣人的不滿。正面支持國民黨很可能會帶動台灣人轉向共產黨。在另一方面，美國支持台灣人的請求，要求接管管理局偏離了既定的國民黨政權。
b. US MEASURES TO EFFECT THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN TAIWAN
WOULD PROVIDE THE USSR AND THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS
WITH ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THEIR ANTI-US PROPAGANDA.
美國預計台灣歷史事件的進程是將提供蘇聯與中共的額外材料其抗美宣傳思想。
c. ANTI-US SENTIMENT PROBABLY WOULD INCREASE IN CHINA,
WERE THE RETURN OF TAIWAN TO THEREPUBLIC OF CHINA IS
ACCEPTED AS A FACT,ALTHOUGH THE EXTENT WOULD VARY
DEPENDING ON THE NATURE OF THE MEASURES ADOPTED BY
THE US. THIS ISSUE COULD WIN INCREASED POPULAR SUPPORT
FOR A COMMUNIST REGIME IN CHINA.
反美情緒在中國可能會加大，但回頭看中華民國在台灣已為接受事實，雖然範圍會有所不同，這取決於美國規劃後通過的自然衍生的措施。此問題可能針對中共政權在中國贏得民眾的支持增加。
d. IT WOULD PROBABLY PRECLUDE THE US MAINTAINING
NORMAL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR RELATIONSHIPS
WITH A COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN CHINA,IF SUCH RELATIONS
WERE DESIRED.THIS WOULD CERTAINLY BY THE CASE IF THE
US SUPPORTED OR WAS ACCUSED OF SUPPORTING A RUMP
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT ON TAIWAN.
它可能會妨礙美國維持正常在中國共產黨政府下的外交和領事關係，如果這種關係是需要的。這種情況下如果美國支持必會受案或者被指控支持在台灣的國民政府殘餘。
e. DEPENDING ON THE NATURE OF THE US PROGRAM,THE TAIWANESE
PROBLEM MIGHT BE RAISED IN THE UN TO THE EMBARRASSMENT OF
THE US.
這取決於美國計劃的性質，台灣問題可能會引發在聯合國對美國的尷尬。
ON THE OTHER HAND, SOME COURSES OF US ACTION MIGHT
PRODUCE RESULTS BENEFICIAL TO US INTERESTS. THE WILL
TO RESIST COMMUNISM IN JAPAN, IN KOREA, IN THE PHILIPPINES
AND ELSEWHERE THROUGHOUT THE FAR EAST, INCLUDING THE
SOUTHEAST COASTAL AREAS OF CHINA,MIGHT BE STRENGTHENED.
A DEFINITE US PROGRAM TOWARD TAIWAN WOULD BE VIEWED AS
AN INDICATION OF US DETERMINATION TO CHECK THE ADVANCE OF
COMMUNISM IN THE FAR EAST WHEREVER PRACTICABLE TO DO SO.
FAVORABLE REACTION MIGHT DEVELOP IF THE US PROGRAM WERE
DEVELOPED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO SECURE LOCAL STABILITY
AND CONTENTMENT IN TAIWAN AND THE SATISFY TAIWANESE
SENTIMENT IN FAVOR OF AUTONOMY. THE PROGRAM WOULD
HAVE TO BE SUPPLEMENTED BY AN INFORMATIONAL
CAMPAIGN DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE US
WAS FAVORABLE TO FAR EASTERN NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS.
IF NOT, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES THROUGHOUT THE FAR
EAST COULD BE DISTINCTLY UNFAVORABLE TO THE US.
而另一方面，美國其中一些科目的行動中可能會產生有利於美國的利益結果。意在抵禦共產主義在日本，韓國，菲律賓和在整個遠東地區別處，包括中國東南沿海地區，則可能得到加強。一個美國對台灣的明確計劃將被視為跡象顯示美國決心來檢查共產主義在遠東前進的可行性。如果美國方案制訂以這樣的方式作為確保地方穩定和繁榮在台灣和符合台灣人氣氛贊成台灣自治可能會是有利的反應發展，本計劃將不得不補充另一個信息選舉設計旨在表明美國志向有利於遠東國。如果沒有，其整個遠東地區的政治後果可能是明顯的不利於美國。
5. CONCLUSION.
結論
THE SITUATION IN TAIWAN IS STEADILY GROWING MORE
CRITICAL FOR THE US BECAUSE OF TAIWANESE DISCONTENT
, CHINESE NATIONALIST PREPARATION OF THE ISLAND AS A
LAST BASTION, AND INCREASING CHINESE COMMUNIST INTEREST
IN AND CAPABILITIES TOWARD THE ISLAND. ASSUMING
US INACTIVITY,TAIWAN WILL EVENTUALLY PASS TO THE
CONTROL OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST. THE STRATEGIC
IMPLICATIONS TO US SECURITY OF SUCH A DEVELOPMENT
WOULD BE SERIOUSLY UNFAVORABLE. IN ANY US PROGRAM TO
PREVENT COMMUNIST CONTROL OF TAIWAN, THE ADVANTAGES
TO BE GAINED THEREBY FROM THE STRATEGIC MILITARY
VIEWPOINT WOULD HAVE TO BE WEIGHED AGAINST UNFAVORABLE
POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES, THE EXTENT OF WHICH WOULD
VARY DEPENDING UPON THE SELECTION AND TIMING OF
MEASURES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAM.
因為台灣人的不滿因此目前對美國來說更為重要的是讓台灣的情況穩定增長，該島作為中國國民黨編制最後的堡壘，並增加中國共產黨對該島嶼的權益和能力。假設美國不做任何處置，台灣雖然不會立即但終將可能轉到中國共產黨的控制下。這樣美國安全戰略的發展將會受到嚴重不利的影響。 在任何美國方案裡，防止台灣不讓共產黨控制，從獲得軍事戰略觀點上的優勢來看，將不得不權衡不利的政治後果，其中範圍會有 所不同，這取決於措施執行本方案的選擇和時間。
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看完了有何感想??政客天天吵,還不都是為了自己, 有誰真心為百姓想過?除了騙,還是騙,百姓什麼都不知道,做牛做馬操勞一生,然後呢?什麼也沒有,22k,物價上漲,國際上沒地位,這是....地獄嗎?難到台灣人真的就只能這樣?醒醒吧台灣人,是時候該團結了,放下那所謂的自私, 一起來想辦法幫助我們自己脫離地獄吧,不要再被那些自私的政客洗腦,因為他們說的都是屁....
一點實際意義都沒有.......
美國CIA解密文件 ORE 39-49 pdf檔：
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000258551.pdf
本社團下載，美國CIA解密文件 ORE 39-49 pdf檔：
https://www.facebook.com/groups/547082858734644/556947681081495/
原翻譯作者：
https://www.facebook.com/notes/yamato-sasaki/台灣人悲慘的歷史真相由美國cia來告訴你cia解密文件ore-39-49/305190999649712
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